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h i g h l i g h t s
• We analyse individual data in a group of coordination experiments.
• We show that behaviour is consistent with a step-thinking model.
• The model accurately predicts behaviour in the last rounds of the game.
• Data is consistent with a heterogeneous population of boundedly rational players.
• The model predicts the bimodal distribution observed for intermediate effort cost.
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a b s t r a c t
Using the experimental sessions of Goeree and Holt (2005), we show that step thinking fits the long-
run outcome of minimum-effort and median-effort games surprisingly well for all values of the cost
parameter. In the latter, the predicted discontinuous behaviour of step thinking accommodates the
bimodal pattern observed for the intermediate values of the cost parameter quite well.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 1. Introduction
The Nash equilibrium concept, central to modern economics,
results from the joint assumption of strategic thinking, best re-
sponse, and mutual consistency. A number of models have been
proposed to account for deviations from the Nash equilibrium. One
of them, step thinking, which includes level-k (Nagel, 1995; Stahl
and Wilson, 1995) and cognitive hierarchy models (Camerer et al.,
2004), dispenseswith themutual consistency requirement, and as-
sumes that a player believes that he/she is of the most sophisti-
cated type, although level-k and CH differ about the beliefs that
players hold on the distribution of types in the population.
These models have been shown to be adept at characterising
initial responses to games (see Crawford et al., 2013). In this pa-
per, we show, using the experimental sessions run by Goeree and
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. Holt (2005), referred to as GH hereafter, that step thinking does
a very good job in capturing the long-run behaviour in coordi-
nation games (for an analysis of initial responses in coordination
games, see Costa-Gomes et al., 2009). In particular, it successfully
captures the distribution of decisions, including the bimodal dis-
tribution of median-effort coordination games, which goes largely
unexplained by the logit equilibrium model.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2
analyses the GH experimental data and Section 3 concludes. Math-
ematical proofs, tables, and figures are contained in the Appendix.
2. Costly coordination games: Goeree and Holt (2005)
GH report the results from a number of coordination games. In
the first one, pairs of subjects choose an effort level, and the result-
ing payoff is the minimum of the efforts minus the cost of one’s
own effort. Theymake sense of the data by applying the logit equi-
librium concept. A ‘‘noise’’ parameter is estimated from the ses-
sions with two-person games, µ = 7.4, so the calibrated model is
used tomake out-of-sample predictions for six sessions with three
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Minimum-effort games.
Effort in last 3 periods Minimum-effort games predicted and actual
average efforts
n = 2 n = 3
c = 0.25 c = 0.75 c = 0.1 c = 0.5
Actual 159 126 170 127
Step thinking 155 125 151 128
Logit 153 127 154 129
persons. These sessions include bothminimum-effort andmedian-
effort coordination games with a range of cost values.
To gain realism, the GH design puts some emphasis on sub-
jects choosing in a continuous interval without focal numbers, and
the interval [110, 170] is used in the experiments. In this sec-
tion, we describe the predictions of a step-thinking model for the
minimum-effort game and the median-effort game in the contin-
uous normalised interval [0, 1],1 under the assumption that the L0
type chooses uniformly. Finally,we compare the step-thinking pre-
dictions to the logit predictions and to the average effort of the last
three periods.2
2.1. Minimum-effort coordination games
Consider first a minimum-effort game. We next show that both
the k-level model and the cognitive hierarchy model share the
same prediction for all types and beliefs.
Proposition 1. Consider the minimum-effort game with payoff func-
tion πi(ei, e−i) = min{ei, e−i} − cei, with e, c ∈ [0, 1]. Let e∗(c, n)
denote the step-thinking prediction for group size n. Then
(i) e∗(c, 2) = 1− c for k ≥ 1,
(ii) e∗(c, 3) = 1−√c for k ≥ 1.
Corollary 1. e∗(c, n) decreases with c and with n.
The sharp prediction of step thinking is that effort choices de-
crease with the effort cost c and with the number of players n.
Table 1 shows that this is exactly what we observe in the exper-
imental data in GH.
From pure inspection, it is easy to infer from Table 1 that a
simple step-thinking model predicts the average behaviour re-
markably well, even when it does not outperform the logit predic-
tion. Given that decisions in the minimum game are concentrated
around the average, both models do a fair job in predicting the ac-
tual distribution of choices.
2.2. Median-effort coordination games
For this game, we will show that behaviour of type L1 depends
on the cost parameter in an intuitive way. But in contrast to the
minimum game, the step-thinking predictions are not unique for
different depths of reasoning and different players’ beliefs. Step-
thinkingmodels based on cognitive hierarchy are useful to explain
treatment effects in this game. Consider again a type-L2 player. If
he/she believes that he/she is facing a population of types L1, then
he/she will play the secure effort (0). However, if he/she believes
1 For simplicity, we make a change of variable. Let Lk be the behaviour of type Lk
for the interval [0, 1]. Then the prediction for the GH treatments will be the linear
transformation 110+ 60Lk.
2 This choice is arbitrary, but it follows the logic of making our analysis
comparable with the original paper, as GH analyse these last three rounds. The
analysis of the last five rounds yields very similar results, and it is available upon
request.170
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Fig. 1. Type L1 behaviour in the median-effort game with three players.
Table 2
Median-effort games.
Effort in last 3 periods Median-effort games predicted and actual
average efforts
c = 0.1 c = 0.4 c = 0.6
Actual 157 137 113
Step thinking 167 110/155 110
Logit 150 140 130
that he/she is facing a population of L0 and L1 types, he/she may
find it optimal to behave as a type-L1 player and force the median
to be above the safe, but inefficient, choice.
Sophisticated players may actually choose to play 0, to match
the decision of L1 players, or a positive effort, depending on their
beliefs about the distribution of L0 and L1 types in the population.
L2 players will certainly never choose an effort level above the
decision of L1 types. Note that as long as the L2 beliefs about the
distribution of types are treatment invariant, treatment effects can
only be explained by the behaviour of type L1.
Wenowderive the behaviour of L1 in our analysis of themedian
game.
Proposition 2. Consider a three-player median-effort game with
players choosing e ∈ [0, 1] and payoff function πi(ei, ej) = median
{ei, ej} − cei with c ∈ [0, 1]. Then, step thinking predicts that a type-
L1 player chooses e∗ = 12 + 12
√
1− 2c if c ≤ 38 and 0 otherwise.
Corollary 2. e∗ decreases with c.
Again, the effort of a type-L1 player decreases with c , although
in a discontinuous manner. For low values of c , L1 exerts a
relatively high effort (larger than 155 in the GH experiments), but,
as soon as the cost reaches the threshold 3/8, L1 optimally chooses
the secure effort. Fig. 1 depicts this.
Table 2 displays the predictions of a type-L1 player together
with the logit predictions and the actual data.
A type-L1 player always finds it optimal to choose efforts at the
boundaries. This is observed for both the high-cost and the low-
cost cases, where the average effort is 113 and 157, respectively. As
the intermediate cost value is remarkably close to the discontinu-
ous threshold cˆ = 38 = 0.375, we inspect the effort distribution in
Fig. 2, searching for traces of any discontinuous behaviour.
The bimodal pattern observed in the data is remarkably close
to the prediction of our model. Players actually choose 110, which
is the step-thinking prediction for values of c larger than the
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threshold, or 155, which is the predicted behaviour for values of
the cost parameter slightly short of the threshold.3
3. Conclusions
In this paper, we apply a simple step-thinking model to the ex-
perimental sessions of Goeree and Holt (2005). We show that the
model fitswellwith the distribution of decisions in the long run. In-
terestingly, decisions in the initial rounds do not differmuch across
treatments. As a result, the averages are all around the midpoint
of all feasible effort choices. However, there is a clear separation
among treatments in the later rounds. These treatment differences
are systematically predicted by the step-thinking model, for both
the minimum-effort game and the median-effort game, and for
each and every value of the cost parameter. For the median games,
the model even captures the bimodal distribution of decisions ob-
served for an intermediate value of the cost parameter.
The standard explanation for long-run behaviour in coordina-
tion games is the logit equilibrium. Relative to the logit responses,
step-thinkingmodels reduce the cognitive load needed to compute
mutual best responses in a complex space of functions, and do a
fairly good job of explaining the data, for a variety of cost param-
eters and groups of minimal size. In the canonical experiment on
coordination games, Van Huyck et al. (1990)’s choice of parame-
ters generates corner predictions for both logit-response and step-
thinking models. The larger group sizes (e.g. n = 14 and n = 16)
naturally drive decisions towards these predictions faster than in
the experiment considered here, even when the predictive success
of our step-thinking model is very similar.4
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider the two cases separately.
Case 1. n = 2.
1.1. Consider the k-level model first. The expected payoff to
a type-L1 player choosing e and facing a type-L0 player is π0(e)
3 Goeree and Holt (2005) provide an alternative explanation for this bimodal
distribution in this treatment: an additional symmetric mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. However, the mixed-strategy equilibrium predicts either the lowest
effort (110) or the highest effort (170). The actual distribution of efforts shown in
Fig. 2 supports the idea that participants do not choose themaximum effort, but the
effort predicted by the pure-strategy k-level model: 155.
4 Fatas and Morales (2013) report in detail the results of this additional test and
extend it to additional games.= −ce+  e0 e1de1 +  1e ede1 = −ec + e− e22 . Solving for the first-
order condition yields the desired solution ∂π(e)
∂e = −c + 1− e =
0 → e∗ = 1 − c. Given that in the minimum game all symmetric
effort profiles are strict Nash equilibria, it follows that higher types
also choose 1− c.
1.2. Consider now the cognitive hierarchy model with an arbi-
trary type distribution, and focus on type L2 with beliefs p0 and p1.
The behaviour of a type-L1 player comes from the maximisation
of p0π0(e) + p1(min{e, e∗} − ce), where e∗ = 1 − c maximises
π0(e). We now show that the optimal choice is e∗ for all belief sys-
tems. This follows because the maximal value of each summand
is reached at e∗ (for the first summand, this is true by definition
of e∗, and, for the second summand, it is true because e∗ is a strict
Nash equilibrium). Once it is established that L2 behaves as type
L1, it follows that higher types will also find it optimal to choose e∗
because they all will face a population composed of two types of
player: those randomising (L0) and those choosing e∗.
Case 2. Let n = 3. The proof follows similar steps.
2.1. Consider the k-level model. All types behave as type L1,
which maximises π(e) = −ce + e1e2 min{e, e1, e2}de1de2. This
double integral can be expanded as follows:
 e
e1=0[
 e1
e2=0 e2de2 + 1
e2=e1 e1de2]de1 +
 1
e1=e[
 e
e2=0 e2de2 +
 1
e2=e ede2]de1. Integration
yields π(e) = 13 e(3 − 3e + e2) − ce. This cubic equation has a
global interior maximum at e∗ = 1−√c .
2.2. Under the cognitive hierarchymodel, we only need to show
that e∗ is the optimal choice for a type-L2 player when he/she faces
one type of each class (L0 and L1). Given that type L1 chooses e∗, it
cannot be optimal to choose a larger effort. Hence, we consider ef-
fortαe∗withα ≤ 1. The expected payoffs areαe∗(1−c)− 12 (αe∗)2,
which aremaximised atα∗ = 1−ce∗ = 1−c1−√c > 1. Hence the optimal
behaviour is α∗ = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The expected payoff to a type-L1 player
choosing effort e and the two opponents choosing e1 and e2
independently using a uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1] is
π(e) = −ce + e1e2 median{e, e1, e2}de1de2. The double integral
can be expanded as follows:
 e
e1=0[
 e1
e2=0 e1de2 +
 e
e2=e1 e2de2 + 1
e2=e ede2]de1 +
 1
e1=e[
 e
e2=0 ede2 +
 e1
e2=e e2de2 +
 1
e2=e1 e1de2]de1.
Integration yields π(e) = 13 + e2 − 23 e3 − ce. This cubic equation
has an interior local maximum at e∗ = 12 + 12
√
1− 2c. This local
maximum is also global when the associated expected payoff is
larger than 1/3 (the payoff attached to the corner solution e = 0).
This occurs if e2 − 23 e3 ≥ ce, that is, as long as c ≤ 38 . 
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